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Este artículo analiza la naturaleza de los ajustes externos en los países con cuenta corriente 
superavitaria. Se explora si un realineamiento de las tasas de crecimiento mundiales —con 
Japón y Europa creciendo más rápido y Estados Unidos, más lento—podría resolver los 
actuales desequilibrios globales. Los resultados principales se pueden resumir así: (a) existe una 
importante asimetría entre los déficits y superávits de cuenta corriente; (b) los superávits 
grandes muestran poca persistencia en el tiempo; (c) las reducciones abruptas del superávit son 
un fenómeno infrecuente; (d) Una disminución de un punto porcentual de crecimiento del PIB, 
en comparación con su tendencia de largo plazo genera un mejoramiento del saldo de la cuenta 
corriente de un cuarto de punto porcentual del PIB. Tomados en conjunto, estos resultados 
indican que un realineamiento del crecimiento global apenas haría un aporte modesto a la 
solución de los desequilibrios globales. Esto significa que, aun si se realinea el crecimiento 
mundial, es probable que el mundo requiera importantes movimientos cambiarios. Este análisis 
también sugiere que, para resolver los desequilibrios globales, será necesaria una reducción del 






In this paper I analyze the nature of external adjustments in current account surplus countries. I 
ask whether a realignment of world growth rates -- with Japan and Europe growing faster, and 
the U.S. growing more slowly -- is likely to solve the current situation of global imbalances. 
The main findings may be summarized as follows: (a) there is an important asymmetry between 
current account deficits and surpluses. (b) Large surpluses exhibit little persistence through 
time. (c) Large and abrupt reductions in surpluses are a rare phenomenon. (d) A decline in GDP 
growth, relative to long term trend, of 1 percentage point results in an improvement in the 
current account balance -- higher surplus or lower deficit -- of one quarter of a percentage point 
of GDP. Taken together, these results indicate that a realignment of global growth would only 
make a modest contribution towards the resolution of global imbalances. This means that, even 
if there is a realignment of global growth, the world is likely to need significant exchange rate 
movements. This analysis also suggests that a reduction in China's (very) large surplus will be 
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The United States has run an increasingly large current account deficit over the last few years. 
J. P. Morgan forecasts that in 2007 the deficit will reach almost one trillion dollars, or 7 percent of 
GDP. This unprecedented situation has generated concern among analysts and policymakers. Many 
argue that this deficit is unsustainable and that, at some point, it will have to decline. Much of the 
recent research on the issue examines whether the U.S. external adjustment will be gradual or 
abrupt, and how it will affect the (real) value of the dollar.1 
Of course, one country’s current deficit must be another country, or countries, surplus. Any 
discussion of the decline of the U.S. deficit therefore implies a discussion of the reduction of the rest 
of the world’s combined current account surpluses. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke made 
this point forcefully in a March 2005 speech—before he became Chairman—in which he argued that 
the main cause of the U.S. external deficit was a major “savings glut” in the rest of the world. 
Bernanke’s words generated significant controversy, and many newspaper pages and blogs were 
filled with commentary on the future Chairman’s views.2 
Many of the participants in these current account debates argue that regional growth 
differentials are at the heart of the so-called global imbalances. The argument runs along the 
following lines: rapid growth in the United States has been associated with an increase in U.S. 
investment (over savings); at the same time, slower growth in Europe and Japan has been associated 
with higher savings (relative to investment) in those parts of the world.3 Global imbalances, the 
argument goes, are a reflection of these growth differentials. An implication of this perspective is 
that, far from reflecting a serious problem, the large current account deficits in the United States are 
a sign of strength; they reflect the fact that the United States has been the locomotive of global 
growth in the last few years. According to this view, a realignment of growth—with an increase in 
growth in Europe and Japan and a slowdown in the United States—would play an important role in 
correcting global imbalances. In a recent interview, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Hank Paulson 
“acknowledged to reporters that… he saw the problem of [the U.S.] deficits as… part of the problem 
of other imbalances in other countries.” The Secretary went on to say that the United States “has for 
a good number of years now been growing much faster than the major developed trading partners, 
Europe and Japan.” For the imbalances to be corrected, Japan and Europe would have “to get the 
kind of growth on the consumption side that is going to make the difference.”4 
In the 1940s, Keynes was particularly interested in understanding the role of surplus countries 
in global adjustment. His proposal for an international clearing union was based on the notion that 
in the face of large payments imbalances, both deficit and surplus nations should share the burden of 
adjustment.5 In recent years, however, very few empirical academic studies systematically analyze 
the process through which countries with large external surpluses have reduced their imbalances. 
                                                       
1. See, for example, recent papers published in the 2005(1) issue of Brookings Papers on Economic Activity; see also the 
September 2006 issue of the Journal of Policy Modeling. 
2. See Bernanke (2005). Some recent theoretical papers on this issue and inquire under what conditions the large U.S. 
deficit could be maintained over time. See, for example, Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2004, 2005). See also Caballero, 
Fahri, and Gourinchas (2006), Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Servén (2000), and De Gregorio (2005). On the global savings 
glut, see Clarida (2005a, 2005b) and R. G. Hubbard “A Paradox of Interest,” Wall Street Journal, 23 June 2005. One of the few 
empirical papers on the savings glut is Chinn and Ito (2005). See Chinn and Lee (2005) for a vector autoregression (VAR) 
analysis of two surplus countries. See also Gruber and Kamin (2005). Two important volumes with papers on the U.S. deficit 
and global adjustment are Bergsten and Williamson (2003, 2004). 
3. This argument is very general and refers to the relationship between investment, savings, and growth; no causality is 
implied in the above statement. 
4. S. R. Weisman, “Paulson Shows Talent for Deflecting Criticism,” International Herald Tribune, 27 September 2006; 
emphasis added.  
5. See, for example, the discussion in Skidelsky (2000, chap. 6), as well as the papers, reports, and memoranda by Keynes 
cited in that chapter. 2  Sebastián Edwards 
 
This paucity of analysis contrasts with the case of current account deficits, which have been studied 
extensively.6 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the historical evidence on current account adjustments in 
surplus countries. I am particularly interested in investigating whether large surpluses are 
persistent and the process and speed through which large surplus countries have reduced their 
imbalances in the past. A particularly relevant issue is whether current account surpluses have 
historically registered large abrupt declines. Such abrupt surplus adjustments would be required if, 
as some fear, the United States—and other Anglo-Saxon countries, such as Australia, New Zealand, 
and the United Kingdom—experience a sudden stop of capital inflows and rapid current account 
reversals. I also investigate the connection between large surpluses and the business cycle and 
consider whether, as recently argued by U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Hank Paulson and others, an 
acceleration in the growth rates of the non-Anglo-Saxon advanced countries is likely to cause a 
decline in their surpluses and thus in global imbalances. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, I analyze the distribution of current 
account deficits and surpluses over the last thirty-five years (1970–2004). The analysis focuses on 
the asymmetries between surpluses and deficits. Section 2 concentrates on the incidence of large and 
persistent current account surpluses. In Section 3, I examine the relationship between current 
account balances and the business cycle. In particular, I ask whether an acceleration in the growth 
rate (relative to the long-term trend) in advanced countries (other than the United States) is likely to 
reduce their surpluses. Section 4 explores the anatomy of large surplus adjustments. I use data for 
thirty-five years and over a hundred countries to analyze the most important characteristics of rapid 
and major declines in current account surpluses. I focus on several aspects of adjustments, including 
their frequency and distribution across different groups of countries and regions. This Section also 
assesses the concomitant behavior of exchange rates, growth, inflation, and interest rates. I use a 
battery of nonparametric tests to determine whether the behavior of these key variables has been 
statistically different in surplus-adjustment countries and a control group of countries. Finally, 
section 5 contains some concluding remarks and discusses directions for future research. The paper 
also has a data appendix. 
 
 
2. CURRENT ACCOUNT SURPLUSES AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF IMBALANCES 
IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 
 
A fundamental accounting principle in open economy macroeconomics is that the sum of all 
current account balances (deficits and surpluses) across all countries in a given year, should add up 
to zero.7 However, the fact that the value of the sum of all current account balances adds up to zero 
does not mean that the number of deficit countries should be equal to the number of surplus 
countries. It is perfectly possible that the vast majority of countries run deficits, while only a handful 
of nations run (rather large) surpluses. In this section I analyze the distribution of current account 
balances (deficits and surpluses) in the world economy during the last thirty-five years, and I 
investigate the evolution of this distribution. I am particularly interested in understanding how the 
increasingly large U.S.—and, more generally, Anglo-Saxon—deficits have been financed. Are they 
being financed by an increasingly larger number of countries? How important are surpluses in the 
emerging countries? What has been the role of commodity-exporting countries? 
The data are taken from the World Bank data set and cover all countries for which there is 
information, including —, transition, and emerging economies. To organize the discussion, I have 
divided the data into six groups: Africa (excluding North Africa); Asia; eastern Europe; industrialized 
(or advanced) nations; Latin America and the Caribbean; and the Middle East and North Africa. The 
                                                       
6. The sum of all deficits is equal to the sum of all surpluses, so knowing how all deficit countries behave in the aggregate 
reveals exactly how the sum of all surplus countries behaves in the aggregate. This, however, is not a very interesting 
proposition. 
7. As is discussed below, the actual sum of balances has become significantly different from zero in recent years. On Current Account Surpluses and the Correction of Global Imbalances  3 
 
data set covers 160 countries in the 1970–2004 period. With over 4,200 observations, this is the 
largest data set available for empirical work on current account balances. Table A1 in the appendix 
details the availability of data on the current account, both for the complete sample and for the 
different groups of countries. In most of the empirical exercises that I report in the rest of this paper, 
I have restricted the data set to countries with a population of over half a million and per capita 
income above $500 in 1985 purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. Also, the analysis presented in this 
paper primarily uses data on current account balances as a percentage of GDP; in what follows, 
positive numbers refer to a current account surplus, while negative numbers refer to deficits. 
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the basic data on current account imbalances over the last thirty-five 
years. Table 1 contains data on average balances, while table 2 presents data on median balances. 
Several interesting results emerge from these tables. First, current account balances in Asia 
experienced a deep change in the period under study. Until 1998, both the mean and median 
reflected the fact that most countries in that region posted large current account deficits and were 
capital importers. Another way of saying this is that until that year the Asian nations had positive 
foreign savings. The situation changed drastically after the 1997–98 Asian debt crises. In 1990–95, 
the mean current account balance in Asia was a deficit of 3.3 percent of GDP; in 1999–2004, it was a 
surplus of 2.4 percent. This represents a remarkable current account reversal in excess of 5 percent 
of GDP! 
Second, current account balances also underwent important changes in most other country 
groups. The Middle East recorded surpluses, on average, after 1999. These became more accentuated 
in 2005–06, as a result of the higher oil prices. 
Third, the magnitude of the external adjustment in the Latin American and Caribbean countries 
is particularly noticeable from the data on median balances (table 2). The current account deficit 
declined from 5.3 percent of GDP in 2002 to barely 1.0 percent of GDP in 2004. 
Finally, the data in tables 1 and 2 also reveal a difference in the mean and median behavior of 
the advanced countries. In the last few years, the mean current account over GDP balance has been 
a small surplus—below 1 percent—in the industrial nations. The median balance in 2003 and 2004 
was a small deficit. 
As pointed out above, even though the value of all current account balances has to add up to zero, 
the number of deficit countries does not have to equal the number of surplus countries. Table 3 
contains data on the proportion of countries with current account surpluses in each year. This table 
shows an important asymmetry between surpluses and deficits: many more countries run deficits 
than surpluses. Only 27.6 percent of the countries in the full sample experienced surpluses. 
Moreover, the percentage of surplus countries has changed significantly through time. This 
proportion was at its highest level of the last twenty-five years in 2003 and 2004, at 38.6 percent and 
37.8 percent, respectively. This pattern indicates that the growing U.S. deficit has been financed by 
an increasingly large array of countries. The last time the United States experienced large deficits 
(1985–87), the proportion of surplus nations was much lower, ranging from 25.0 percent to 27.9 
percent. In many ways this is not surprising, as the magnitude of the U.S. deficit has been 
significantly larger in the last few years than in 1985–87. As table 3 shows, the main difference 
between these two periods lies with the Asian countries: in 1985–87 less than 25 percent of the Asian 
nations ran a current account surplus; in 2002–04 almost 70 percent of the Asian nations ran a 
surplus.  
These results do not say anything regarding causal relationships. It is not possible to know if the 
number of surplus countries has increased because there is a need to finance an ever growing U.S. 
current account deficit, or if the U.S. deficit has expanded because the number of surplus countries 
has grown over the last few years.8 Moreover, since these balances are gathered by independent 
country agencies, there is bound to be a statistical discrepancy. Thus, while the sum of all current 
account balances should add up to zero, it is highly unlikely that for any given year the sum of these 
balances would actually be identical to zero. The size of the statistical discrepancy has been growing, 
however, and it has become increasingly negative since 1997 (IMF, 2002). According to the 2003 
                                                       
8. Bernanke’s (2005) view on the global savings glut assumes that the causal relationship goes from higher national 
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World Economic Outlook, the (negative) discrepancy exceeded 3 percent of the world’s imports in 
2002. This might be called the mystery of the missing current account surpluses. Marquez and 
Workman (2001) argue that it may reflect a number of factors, including cross-country differences in 
the lags with which actual transactions are recorded; asymmetric valuations of the same transaction 
in the two countries involved; and misreporting of investment income.  
 
3. HIGH AND PERSISTENT LARGE CURRENT ACCOUNT SURPLUSES 
 
According to modern intertemporal models of the current account, including the portfolio-based 
models of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), Kraay and Ventura (2000, 2003) and Edwards (2002, 2004), 
countries tend to experience short-term deviations from their long-run sustainable current account 
levels.9 This implies that large current account imbalances—or large deviations from 
sustainability—should not persist through time. Once the temporary shocks that trigger the large 
imbalances have passed, the current account will return to its long-run sustainable level. In this 
section, I use the data set described above to analyze the degree of persistence through time of large 
current account surpluses. I am particularly interested in finding out whether some countries have 
experienced very high surpluses for very long periods of time. 
As a first step, I constructed two measures of high surpluses. (I also constructed equivalent 
measures of high deficits.) High Surplus 1 is an index that takes the value of one if, in a particular 
year, a country’s surplus is among its region’s 25 percent highest surpluses; the index takes a value 
of zero otherwise. High Surplus 2 takes the value of one if, in a particular year, a country’s surplus is 
among its region’s 10 percent highest surpluses; it takes a value of zero otherwise. 
Table 4 lists the countries that have had persistently high surpluses. I define persistently high 
surpluses as occurring when the country in question has a high surplus, as defined above, for at least 
four years in a row. The first column in table 4 reports the results for High Surplus 1, while the 
second column covers High Surplus 2. As the table shows, forty-one countries had persistently high 
surpluses according to the High Surplus 1 definition, and while only seventeen did so according to 
the more stringent High Surplus 2 definition. Some interesting facts emerge from this table. First, 
the number of large countries that have had persistently large surpluses (using the High Surplus 1 
definition) is very small. Germany and Japan are the only advanced nations that make the list, and 
China and Russia are the only large emerging and transition countries. Second, many oil-producing 
countries run persistently high surpluses, particularly in the years following a major oil price 
increase. Third, many East Asian countries had persistently large surpluses in after the 1997–98 
debt crises. Finally, only a handful of countries have truly maintained long-term high surpluses. The 
most important ones are Switzerland and Singapore. 
Overall, the picture that emerges from table 4 has two implications. First, the fact that large 
countries don’t seem to run very persistent high surpluses is consistent with the notion that to 
finance the increasingly large U.S. deficit, more and more small and medium-sized countries have to 
run surpluses. Second, the lack of persistency suggests that the majority of countries that do run 
large surpluses do so for a rather limited period of time. After posting these large surpluses, these 
countries go through an adjustment process that reduces their surpluses to more “normal”—or 
sustainable—levels. An important question, which I address in section 4 of this paper, involves the 
nature of these surplus adjustment episodes: from a historical point of view, have these adjustments 
been gradual or abrupt? Other relevant questions from a policy perspective include how other key 
macroeconomic variables behave during the adjustment and whether macroeconomic variables such 
as inflation, interest rates, exchange rates, and growth behave differently in countries undergoing a 
surplus adjustment than in non adjustment countries. 
 
                                                       
9. In these models, changes in current account balances are largely the result of efforts by domestic economic agents to 
smooth consumption. The sustainable level of the current account balance, in turn, will depend on portfolio decisions by both 
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3.2 The Persistence of High Surpluses: Some Econometric Results 
 
To investigate further the degree of persistence of high current account imbalances, I estimated a 
number of variance component probit regressions of the following type: 
 








where Highjt is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if country j has a high surplus in period t 
(using the two different high surplus measures defined above); Xjt refers to other covariates including 
time, country, and region fixed effects. The error term, εjt, is given by a variance component model: εjt 
=  νj + μjt. The variable  νj is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with zero mean and 
variance σν
2; μjt is normally distributed with zero mean and variance σμ
2 = 1. My main interest lies 
with the βk coefficients on lagged high surpluses: I want to find out whether having had a high 
surplus in the past (up to four years) affects the probability of having a high deficit in the current 
period. An important question is whether the degree of persistence is similar for high surpluses and 
high deficits. To address this issue, I also estimated equations such as equation (1) for deficit 
countries.10 Table 5 reports the resulting estimated marginal effects, which capture the change in 
the probability of a high surplus (deficit) in period t given a high surplus (deficit) in period t – k.11 
These results suggest that the degree of persistence of high deficits is larger than that of high 
surpluses, especially for the stricter definition of high imbalances (High Surplus 2). Beyond the first 
lag, the point estimates of the marginal effects are very small, and in many cases they are not 
statistically significant. This confirms the results in table 4 indicating that the degree of persistence 
of large current account imbalances tended to be low in the last thirty-five years. 
 
3.3 Large and Persistent Surpluses in Absolute Terms 
 
The results presented above on persistently high deficits were constructed using the ratio of the 
current account balance to GDP. From a global financing perspective, however, what really matters 
is which countries have large deficits measured in convertible currency. Table 6 contains data on 
countries with persistently high surpluses, measured in absolute terms. The table differs 
significantly with table 4, which measures surpluses as a proportion to GDP. As expected, large 
countries have a stronger presence in table 6: France and Italy are now classed as having highly 
persistent surpluses, and Japan’s streak of high surpluses appears to be much longer than in table 4. 
The most important difference between the two tables is that according to table 6, China has run a 
persistently high surplus for more than a decade. This suggests that, as many have argued for some 
time now, an adjustment in China’s large external surplus will be an important component in solving 
current global imbalances. 
 
4. CURRENT ACCOUNT SURPLUSES AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE  
 
One of the basic macroeconomic relationships—and one that is taught early on to undergraduate 
students—is that the current account is the difference between savings and investment. This means 
that countries that experience an investment boom will undergo a deterioration of their current 
account. Likewise, countries that experience an increase in savings will tend to post larger 
surpluses. This savings-investment perspective is complementary to the more popular view that 
focuses on trade flows, net incomes from abroad, and international net transfers. The advantage of 
concentrating on the savings-investment relationship is that it allows analysts to focus on the way in 
                                                       
10. The computation of the High Deficit 1 and High Deficit 2 variables parallels that of the two high surplus variables. 
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and they have been evaluated for the mean values of all the regressors. In addition to these panel probits, I also estimated 
dynamic linear probability models and dynamic panel probits (Heckman, 1981). The results obtained support those presented 
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which changes in aggregate demand—and in policies that affect aggregate demand, for that 
matter—will affect current account balances. 
A practical implication of the savings-investment perspective involves the role of differences in 
regional growth rates on current account balances. As described earlier, the analysis runs along the 
following lines. The rapid growth in the United States over the past few years has been associated 
with an increase in U.S. investment (over savings), while slower growth in Europe and Japan has 
been associated with higher savings (relative to investment) in those parts of the world.12 According 
to this view, global imbalances are largely a reflection of these growth differentials. Far from 
reflecting a serious problem, the large current account deficits in the United States are a sign of 
strength, in that they reflect the fact that the United States has been the locomotive of global growth 
in the last few years. An implication of this perspective is that an international realignment of 
growth (with an increase in growth in Europe and Japan and a slowdown in the United States) 
would play an important role in correcting global imbalances.13 In a 1999 article, the Financial 
Times summarized the IMF’s World Economic Outlook views on global imbalances as follows 
(emphasis added): 
 
“Current account imbalances between the world's three main economic blocks have widened in recent 
years, reflecting stronger growth in the U.S. economy than in Japan and Europe.”14 
 
In a 2004 speech, then Undersecretary of the Treasury John B. Taylor discussed the relationship 
between savings, investment, growth differentials, and global imbalances: 
 
“[The] increase in investment was a key factor in U.S. economic growth during this period. Over a 
longer period the increase in investment will expand the capital stock… [T]he increase of the U.S. 
current account deficit over more than a decade has been linked to domestic U.S. capital formation 
increasing more than U.S. saving.…” (Taylor, 2004, emphasis added). 
 
Regarding the correction of global imbalances, in the same speech Taylor identified a need to 
boost global growth: 
 
“We would certainly not object—in fact, we'd be very pleased—if other countries strengthened their 
investment environment, their level of investment, and their economic growth performance. [Pro-
growth] policies are those that will raise global growth… [and] will ameliorate the deficit by raising U.S. 
exports and increasing investment opportunities around the globe.… [M]ore growth throughout the 
world… [will] reduce external imbalances.” (Taylor 2004, emphasis added). 
 
In 2003, former IMF Chief Economist Michael Mussa wrote the following: 
 
“With respect to the necessary correction of the U.S. current account deficit, acceleration of growth in 
the rest of the world and the depreciation of the U.S. dollar since 2001 should help to bring an end to 
further increases in the U.S. imbalance.” (Mussa, 2003, emphasis added). 
 
Many authors address the question of whether large external imbalances are worrisome by 
investigating whether they are consistent with intertemporal optimizing models that posit that 
savings and investment decisions—and thus the current account—are the result of optimal decisions 
by the private sector. If the data support the intertemporal model, observed current account balances 
(even very large balances) are the reflection of optimal decisions, so they should not be a cause for 
concern. An important and powerful implication of intertemporal models is that at the margin, 
changes in national savings should be fully reflected in changes in the current account balance 
                                                       
12. This very general argument refers to the relationship between investment, savings, and growth. No causality is 
implied in the above statement. 
13. Implicit in this view is the notion that growth realignment would require higher savings (and lower investment) in 
the United States and higher investment (and lower savings) in Europe and Japan (and maybe other parts of non-China 
Asia). 
14. See R. Chote, “IMF: U.S. Slowdown Now Inevitable,” Financial Times, 21 April 1999.  On Current Account Surpluses and the Correction of Global Imbalances  7 
 
(Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996). Empirically, however, this prediction of the theory has been 
systematically rejected by the data.15 Typical analyses that regress the current account on savings 
have found a coefficient of approximately 0.25, significantly below the hypothesized value of one. 
Many numerical simulations based on the intertemporal approach have also failed to account for 
current account behavior. According to these models, a country’s optimal response to negative 
exogenous shocks is to run very high current account deficits, indeed much higher than what is 
observed in reality. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), for example, develop a model of a small open 
economy where under a set of plausible parameters, the steady-state trade surplus equals 45 percent 
of GDP, and the steady-state debt-to-GDP ratio is 15.16 
The rejection by the data of the intertemporal (or present value) model of the current account has 
generated an intense debate among international economists. Some argue that there is a group of 
“usual suspects” that explain this outcome (Nason and Rogers, 2006); others hold that the problem 
resides in the low power of traditional statistical tests (Mercereau and Miniane, 2004). Kraay and 
Ventura (2000, 2003) and Ventura (2003) propose some amendments to the traditional intertemporal 
model that go a long way in helping bridge theory with reality. In their model, portfolio decisions 
play a key role in determining the evolution of the current account balance. When investors care 
about both return and risk, changes in savings will not be translated into a one-to-one improvement 
in the current account. Investors will want to maintain the composition of their portfolios, and only a 
proportion of the additional savings will be devoted to increasing the holdings of foreign assets (that 
is, bank loans). Kraay and Ventura further argue that when short-run adjustment costs in 
investment are added to the analysis, the amended intertermporal model tracks reality quite closely. 
In this setting, the behavior of countries’ net foreign assets play an important role in explaining 
current account behavior. In particular, and as pointed out by Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2002, 2003), 
changes in foreign asset valuation stemming from exchange rate adjustments will tend to affect the 
adjustment process and the evolution of current account balances. 
Intertemporal-based models of the current account do not generate clear-cut predictions on the 
relation between growth (or deviations of growth from long-term trend) and the current account 
balance. Generally speaking, the relationship may be positive or negative, depending on the source of 
the shock that affects growth.17 For instance, if the source of stronger growth is an expansion in 
exports, the current account balance will tend to improve. If, on the other hand, growth accelerates 
because of an expansion in household expenditure, the current account is likely to deteriorate.  
In this section, I take a somewhat different approach to analyzing the determinants of the 
current account and the mechanisms through which current global imbalances are likely to be 
solved. Instead of testing whether the implications of the present value model of the current account 
hold for a particular set of countries, I use panel data to investigate the relationship between the 
business cycle and the current account. In particular, I ask how sensitive have current account 
balances been to expansions (contractions) in real GDP growth, relative to its long-term trend, in 
different countries. I also investigate how current account balances have been affected by terms-of-
trade shocks, fiscal imbalances, changes in the real exchange rate, and the country’s net external 
position or net international investment position. In principle, this analysis should throw light on 
the extent to which an expansion that propels growth in Europe and Japan closer to its long-term 
trend—or, for that matter, above this trend—will affect global imbalances. The analysis also 
provides an indication of the long-run relationship between a country’s net external position and its 
current account balance.18 
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4.1 The Empirical Model 
 
The empirical analysis starts from the notion that, in the long run, a country’s current account 
balance (relative to nominal GDP) should be at its sustainable level. Modern analyses of current 
account sustainability are based on the idea that in equilibrium the ratio of the net external position 
(NEP) to GDP (or to some other aggregate) has to stabilize at some level.19 The relationship between 
the equilibrium and stable ratio of NEP to GDP—which I denote as γ—and the sustainable current 
account to GDP balance (SCA) may be written as follows:20 
 
   
SCA =γ g
T +π ( ),  (2) 
 
where (gT + π) is the nominal growth rate of trend GDP, gT is the long-run trend real growth rate of 
GDP, and π is the long-run steady-state inflation rate. If a country’s equilibrium NEP-to-GDP ratio 
is negative (γ < 0), then the country is said to be a net debtor, and it will run a current account 
deficit. If the country is a global net creditor, γ will be positive, and the country will run a 
sustainable current account surplus.21 Current account regressions, then, should incorporate this 
sustainability condition and provide estimates on the long-run relationship between the current 
account balance and the NEP-to-GDP ratio. The empirical analysis presented in this section is based 
on a two-equation formulation: 
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These equations use the following notation: 
 
•  CAj,t is the current account balance relative to GDP, in country j in year t (a positive number 
denotes a current account surplus). 
•  gTj,t is country j’s long-term trend per capita growth rate, and gj,t–1 is country j’s actual per 
capita growth rate in period t – 1. 
•  The term (gjT – gj,t–1) is thus a measure of the growth gap: if the country in question is 
growing below trend, this term is positive; if it is expanding at a rate that exceeds the long-
term trend, the term is negative. This term captures the effect of the business cycle on the 
current account balance. If economic activity slows down, (gjT – gj,t–1) will become positive. 
There are, of course, many reasons for (gjT – gj,t–1) to be positive or negative, but the 
formulation in equation (3) does not distinguish between the specific factors driving (gjT – gj,t–
1). In that sense, this analysis is very general. In long-run equilibrium, however, (gjT – gj,t–1) = 
0. An important question refers to the sign of coefficient α1. If an acceleration in growth 
(relative to long-term trend) results in a deterioration of the current account balance, the 
estimated coefficient of (gjT – gj,t–1)—that is, the coefficient α1—will be positive. In this paper, 
however, I am interested not only in the sign of α1, but also in the magnitude of the 
coefficient. In equation (3), as in most panel data equations, the coefficients are common for 
all regions and countries. In section 3.4 on robustness, however, I present results for 
estimations that allow some of the coefficients to differ by region. 
•  NEPGDPj* is a measure of the equilibrium (long-run) ratio of country’s j’s net external assets 
(or NIIP) to GDP. It will be positive if the country is a net global creditor and negative if the 
country is a net debtor. In the estimation of equation (3), its coefficient should be positive; it 
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will capture the long-run relationship between NEP and the sustainable current account 
balance. The way this variable is constructed in the empirical analysis is explained in detail 
below. 
•  The variables Xij,t–k in equation (3) are other determinants of the current account, such as 
changes in the real exchange rate, the fiscal balance over GDP, and changes in the 
international terms of trade. These Xij,t–k are defined such that they equal zero in long-run 
steady-state equilibrium. 
•  The error term, εj,t, is given by given by εj,t = νj + μj,t, where νj is an i.i.d. country-specific 
disturbance with zero mean and variance σν
2; and μj,t is normally distributed with zero mean 
and variance σμ
2 = 1. 
 
Equation (4) is the equation for the long-run (trend) growth rate of real GDP. The Zij are 
economic determinants, while the Vij are institutional determinants of long-term growth. ξj is an 
error term assumed to be heteroskedastic. In determining the specification of equation (4), I followed 
the standard literature on growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). 
An important property of the model in equations (3) and (4) is that since in the long-run 
equilibrium, (gjT – gj,t–1) = 0 and Xij,t–k = 0, it follows that 
 








This is an estimate of the long-run sustainable current account balance. If the model given by 
equations (3) and (4) is estimated for different groups of countries, the estimated φ coefficients will 
help provide an estimate for the sustainable current account balance, for different values of 
NEPGDPj*. Also, if α0 = 0, the estimated coefficient φ is the average value of (gT + π). In the base run, 
I estimate a common φ for all countries; in section 3.4, however, I report different φ for different 
regions. 
The specification in equations (3) and (4) differs from recent papers on current account behavior 
in several ways. The most important difference with Chinn and Prasad (2003) and Chinn and Ito 
(2005) is that the long-run current account balance does converge toward φNEPGDPj* in the long 
run. Another difference is that while I have included the deviations of (per capita) growth from the 
long-term trend, Chinn and Prasad (2003) and Chinn and Ito (2005) focus on average growth. Chinn 
and Ito (2005) incorporate governance and institutional variables directly into the estimation of the 
current account balance; in this paper, in contrast, institutional variables play a role through the 
long-run value of NEPGDPj*. Another recent paper similar in spirit to this one is Gruber and Kamin 
(2005). Like Chinn and Ito (2005), Gruber and Kamin (2005) incorporate institutional variables 
directly into the estimation of their current account equations. They also include dummy variables 
for crisis periods. Another important difference between this paper and Gruber and Kamin (2005) 
has to do with the growth terms: the relevant growth variable in equation (3) is deviations of growth 
from trend, while Gruber and Kamin (2005) focus on the change in per capita growth differentials. 
 
4.2 Estimation and Basic Results 
 
I estimated the system contained in equations (3) and (4) using a two-step procedure. In the first 
step, I estimated the long-run growth equation (4) using a cross-country data set. These data are 
averages for 1974–2004, and the estimation makes a correction for heteroskedasticity. First-stage 
estimates are then used to generate long-run predicted growth rates to replace gjT in the current 
account equation (3). In the second step, I estimate equation (3) using both random- and fixed-effects 
methods. In estimating equation (4) for long-run per capita growth, I followed the now-standard 
growth literature  (summarized by Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995), and use average data for 1974–
2004. In terms of the equation specification, I also follow Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Sachs and 
Warner (1995), and Dollar (1992), among others, and assume that the GDP growth rate (gjT) depends 
on a number of structural, policy, and social variables. More specifically, I include the following 10  Sebastián Edwards 
 
covariates: the log of initial GDP per capita; the investment ratio; the coverage of secondary 
education; an index of the degree of openness of the economy; the ratio of government consumption 
to GDP; and regional dummies for Latin American, sub-Saharan African, and transition economies. 
The results obtained in this first step estimation of the long-run growth equations are not reported 
due to space considerations; they are available on request. 
The empirical definition of NEPGDPj*  in equation (3) poses an interesting challenge. 
Conceptually this variable is the equilibrium, or desired, long-term ratio of country j’s net external 
position relative to GDP. It is difficult, however, to obtain data on this desired ratio. In the basic 
specification, I proxied NEPGDPj* by the mean value of the actual net external position to GDP, for 
the period 1970–2004. To check the robustness of the results, I estimated regressions using 
alternative definitions of NEPGDPj*; these exercises are discussed in subsection 3.3. 
Following the empirical literature on the current account, I included the four Xij,t covariates in 
the estimation of equation (3) (see the appendix for data sources). 
 
•  A terms-of-trade shock, defined as the percentage change in the relative price of exports to 
imports, lagged one period. A positive (negative) number represents an improvement 
(deterioration) in the terms of trade. Its coefficient is expected to be positive, indicating that 
a positive terms-of-trade shock results in an improvement in the current account balance. 
•  The accumulated percentage change in the real exchange rate over a three-year span, lagged 
one period. The real exchange rate is defined such that a positive change represents a real 
exchange rate depreciation. The coefficient is expected to be positive: a real depreciation 
results in a higher (lower) surplus (deficit). 
•  The ratio of the public sector deficit to GDP, lagged one period. The coefficient is expected to 
be negative.  
•  To check for robustness, I considered alternative specifications and variable definitions. The 
results show that the main findings from the base run are not significantly affected (see 
sections 3.3 and 3.4). 
 
In the regression analysis reported in this section, I focus on medium-sized and large countries; 
these are defined as countries with a GDP in 1995 of at least US$52 billion.22 The sample includes 
forty-one countries over the period 1974–2004. Of these, twenty are advanced nations and twenty-
one are emerging or transition countries. The size of the sample was determined by data availability; 
not all countries have data for all variables (see the appendix for a list of countries). I estimated 
equation (3) for three alternative samples within the group of large countries: advanced, 
nonadvanced, and all countries. 
The base estimates are presented in table 7, where the first three columns report the results for 
random effects and the last three columns those for fixed effects. Robust standard errors were used 
to estimate the z statistics. All the estimated coefficients have the expected signs, and the vast 
majority is significant at expected levels. Moreover, the estimated coefficients are very similar for 
random and fixed effects. The point estimates for the coefficient of (gT + π) are very similar across 
samples and estimation techniques, ranging from 0.180 to 0.225. These estimates indicate that a 
decline in the per capita GDP growth rate of, say, 1 percentage point below the long-term trend 
would result in an increase in the current account surplus of at most one quarter of a percentage 
point of GDP. 
These results have interesting implications for the analysis of global imbalances. In the case of 
Japan, for example, my estimates indicate that per capita growth was, on average, 3.3 percentage 
points below trend in 2003–04. Had Japan’s growth been on trend, its current account surplus would 
thus have been 0.54–0.68 percent of GDP lower than it actually was. GDP growth was also below 
trend in other large industrial countries in 2003–04: in Germany and Italy,  it was 1.0 percent below 
trend, and in France, it was 0.6 percent below trend. Section 3.5 presents a more detailed analysis of 
the effects of a realignment of national growth rates on global imbalances. 
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The estimates in table 7 also imply that improvements in the terms of trade result in larger 
(smaller) surpluses (deficits); this effect is particularly clear in the advanced countries. An 
accumulated real depreciation similarly improves the current account balance. The point estimates 
of this coefficient are significantly higher for the emerging and transition countries than for the 
advanced nations. A higher public sector deficit, on the other hand, tends to reduce the current 
account surplus or increase the deficit.  
The coefficients of NEPGDPj*  are positive, as expected, and significant.23 The estimated 
coefficients of NEPGDPj* range from 0.064 to 0.070, and they are similar for the advanced nations 
and the emerging and transition countries. The results in this table suggest that for advanced 
countries with a long-run net asset position of 30 percent of GDP, the sustainable current account 
balance is a surplus of 1.9 percent of GDP.24 For an (average) emerging nation with a negative net 
external position of 40 percent of GDP (that is, NEPGDPj*= –40), the long-run sustainable deficit 
will, on average, equal 1.1 percent of GDP.25 
 
4.3 Alternative Definitions of NEPGDPj* 
 
For the estimations presented in table 7, the long-run equilibrium NEPGDPj* was proxied by the 
average ratio of net external assets to GDP over the sample period. In this subsection, I report 
results obtained using an alternative measure of NEPGDPj*. I followed a two-step procedure to 
generate this new variable: first, I used long-term averages to estimate a cross-section equation for 
NEPGDP j *; second, I used the predicted values obtained from this equation as estimates of 
NEPGDPj*. In estimating the cross-section equation, the dependent variable is the actual 1970–2004 
average of the net external position for each country. I considered the following covariates when 
specifying the equation: (a) the degree of trade openness, measured as exports plus imports over 
GDP (this coefficient is expected to be positive); (b) the ratio of government consumption to GDP (the 
expected coefficient is negative); (c) a dummy variable for commodity exporting countries (including 
oil exporters); (d) a measure of political stability, captured by an index of civil liberties; (e) the 
average per capita GDP growth rate; (f) a measure of the degree of financial openness, calculated as 
the sum of total external liabilities and total external assets (which include debt, equities, FDI, and 
international reserves) relative to GDP (the expected coefficient is positive); (g) inflation, measured 
as the average percentage rate of change of CPI (the expected coefficient is negative); (h) the initial 
level of per capita GDP (the expected coefficient is positive); and (i) regional dummy variables. 
Table 8 reports the results obtained from the estimation of this long-run cross-country regression 
of the net external position, for a sample of 130 countries; the first column excludes regional 
dummies, while the second column includes them. As shown by the between-group R squared, the fit 
is quite good. Moreover, many of the coefficients are statistically significant and have the expected 
signs. Whether a country is a commodity exporter doesn’t appear to affect the (average) level of NEP 
over GDP. Interestingly, there is no evidence that countries with a faster average economic growth 
rate have a higher NEP–to-GDP ratio. 
I used the estimates in column 2 of table 8 to generate predicted values of NEPGDP that include 
estimates of the country-specific error component. I call this variable NEPGDP_STAR, and I used it 
as a proxy for NEPGDPj* in a series of regressions for the current account equation (3). The results 
obtained when a random-effects procedure was used are in table 9; z statistics were computed using 
robust standard errors. The overall results are similar to those reported in table 8: all coefficients 
have the expected signs and most of them are significant at conventional levels. The estimated 
coefficients of NEPGDP_STAR are lower than those obtained when the average NEP-to-GD ratio 
was used (see table 7). The difference between these two coefficients is particularly marked for the 
emerging and transition countries: 0.070 in table 7, versus 0.011 in table 9. This implies that 
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according to table 9 the (average) sustainable current account balance for the emerging and 
transition countries is smaller than previously suggested. A possible interpretation for this result—
and one that I investigate in subsection 3.4—is that this aggregate estimate is averaging (very) 
different estimates for the different regions. 
An important result for the discussion on global imbalances is that the estimates of the 
coefficients for (gjT – gj,t–1) in table 9 are similar to those reported above, and they support the view 
that current account balances have been quite sensitive to the business cycle. 
 
4.4 Potential Endogeneity and Other Robustness Checks 
 
This subsection addresses potential endogeneity issues and reports the results from a number of 
robustness checks. The main results reported above stand up to this scrutiny. 
 
4.4.1 Potential endogeneity  
 
One of the covariates in the current account equation (3) is the (lagged) accumulated change in 
the real exchange rate. This variable could potentially be influenced by the perceived (future) 
evolution of the current account.26 To assess this potential source of endogeneity I re-estimated 
equation (3) using an instrumental variables (IV) random-effects procedure. The following 
instruments were used: an index that measures the proportion of countries in the country’s region 
that were subject to a sudden decline in capital inflows, lagged one period; a similar index that 
measures the incidence of sudden declines in inflows in other regions, also lagged one period; 
changes in the terms of trade, lagged two periods; inflation, lagged two periods; initial (1970) per 
capita GDP; population growth; and regional dummy variables. The results obtained from this IV 
random-effects estimation are reported in table 10. In most respects, the results are very similar to 
those reported above. The estimated coefficients of NEPGDPj* and (gjT – gj,t-1) continue to have the 
expected positive sign and to be significant. Also, their point estimates are quite similar to those 
reported above. The most important difference between the IV random-effects estimates in table 10 
and the results in tables 7 and 9 is that the coefficient of the accumulated change in the real 
exchange rate is no longer significant for advanced countries. A possible interpretation of this result 
is that the measure of real exchange rate changes is a poor proxy for real exchange rate 
misalignment. 
 
4.4.2 Alternative samples 
 
I also estimated the model in equations (3) and (4) for alternative samples; the detailed results 
are not reported here due to space considerations. For a sample of smaller countries, the point 
estimate of the (gjT–gj,t–1) variable is significantly smaller, although still significant. Other sample 
variations, including the elimination of outliers, did not significantly alter the main results. 
 
4.4.3 Alternative specifications 
 
I considered alternative specifications of the current account equation (3). In particular, instead 
of the accumulated change in the real exchange rate, I used a variable that captures the deviation of 
an estimate of the equilibrium real exchange rate and the one-period-lagged actual real exchange 
rate. I also modeled in greater detail the mechanics of the dynamic adjustment of the current 
account. In both cases, the results obtained are similar to those reported above; these results are 
available on request. 
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4.4.4 Region-specific coefficients 
 
The results reported above were obtained under the assumption of common coefficients for all 
countries. This, of course, need not be the case. This subsection reports on estimations using 
different regional coefficients for NEPGDPj* and (gjT – gj,t–1), which I obtained by interacting regional 
dummies with these two variables. The results are reported in table 11. The coefficients for the 
different variables continue to have the same signs as in the previous tables, and they continue to be 
significant at conventional levels. The point estimate of (gjT – gj,t–1), however, is somewhat smaller 
than what was reported earlier. Two of the regional dummies interacted with NEPGDPj*  are 
significant: namely, Latin America and Asia. The results in table 11 suggest that the coefficient of 
net external assets for the Latin American region is not different from zero; the chi-squared test has 
a value of 0.29 and a p value of 0.58. The coefficient of net external assets interacted with the Asia 
dummy is 0.039 and significant. This implies an overall coefficient for Asia of 0.095. 
The estimate in table 11 also includes terms that interact regional dummy variables with (gjT – 
gj,t–1). The interactive terms for Asia and Africa are significant at conventional levels. Their point 
estimates suggest that the sensitivity of the current account to changes in growth relative to trend is 
higher in these two regions than in the rest of the world. 
 
4.4.5 Interacting growth deviations with net external assets 
 
Kraay and Ventura (2000) raise the issue of whether the effects of different shocks on the current 
account depend on the country’s net external position. To explore this possibility in the current 
context, I included in the estimation of equation (3) a variable that interacts (gjT – gj,t–1) with the 
(twice lagged) ratio of net external assets to GDP. The estimated coefficient was negative, as 
suggested by Kraay and Ventura (2000), but it was not significant at conventional levels. The results 
are not reported, but are available on request. 
 
4.5 Growth Realignment in Japan and the Euro Area  
 
As pointed out above, many analysts and government officials argue that a realignment of 
regional growth—with Japan and the Euro area growing faster and the United States experiencing a 
slowdown—would contribute significantly toward solving current global imbalances. In this 
subsection, I use the econometric estimates reported above to investigate the extent to which global 
imbalances would be reduced if growth moved toward a more “normal” level in a number of key 
countries. In particular, I assume that per capita growth increases in Japan and Germany, two 
countries with a combined surplus of US$270 billion that year. I assume that Japan’s growth 
increases by 3.3 percent relative to its 2003–04 average, while Germany’s growth increases by 1.0 
percent. These higher growth rates would put both of these countries back onto their long-term 
growth trends. In addition, I assume that France and Italy, which posted small deficits in 2005, 
increase their growth by 1.0 percent each.27 
Using the estimated coefficients from the equations in table 7, the acceleration in growth in 
Japan and the most important euro area countries would result in a surplus reduction of merely 
US$40 billion. Of this amount, US$27 billion would correspond to a surplus reduction in Japan, and 
US$13 billion to a surplus reduction in the euro zone. Finally, if U.S. growth declines toward its 
long-term trend, the U.S. deficit would fall by US$23 billion.  
The magnitude of these corrections is quite small when compared with the type of adjustment 
that many analysts believe is required. Indeed, if the sustainable current account deficit in the 
United States is in the neighborhood of 3.6 percent of GDP, the needed correction would add up to 
approximately US$350 billion. These results suggest, then, that global imbalances will not be 
corrected without a significant adjustment in China and the oil-exporting countries. Moreover, these 
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results support the view that (significant) exchange r a t e  r e a l i g n m e n t s  w i l l  b e  n e e d e d  t o  c o r r e c t  
global imbalances.28  
 
 
5. THE ANATOMY OF MAJOR AND RAPID SURPLUS ADJUSTMENTS 
 
Since the mid-1990s, a number of authors have analyzed episodes of sudden stops of capital 
inflows and current account reversals.29 These studies focus on the abrupt decline of international 
financing and the resulting rapid turnaround in the current account, from a large deficit to a 
moderate deficit (or even to a surplus). Until now, there have been no equivalent studies on episodes 
of large and sudden adjustments in surplus countries. This section aims to fill this void by exploring 
the anatomy of surplus adjustment episodes, or large reductions in current account surpluses over 
short periods of time. In particular, I am interested in analyzing how key macroeconomic variables—
including inflation, GDP growth, interest rates, and real exchange rates—behave in the period 
surrounding these surplus adjustments. I define surplus adjustments in two alternative ways. First, 
a 2 percent surplus adjustment is defined as a reduction of a country’s current account surplus by at 
least 2 percent of GDP in one year. In addition to this requirement, the initial surplus has to be of 3 
percent of GDP or higher. Second, a 3 percent surplus adjustment is defined as an accumulated 
reduction of a country’s current account surplus in at least 3 percent of GDP in three years, from an 
initial surplus of 3 percent of GDP or higher. 
Table 12 contains information on the incidence of both definitions of surplus adjustments for the 
period 1970–2004. The data are for the full sample, as well as for six groups of countries: advanced 
economies, Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia, Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and 
eastern Europe. The 2 percent surplus adjustment has been a more common phenomenon than the 3 
percent surplus adjustment. The overall incidence for the former is 6.6 percent; it is only 3.0 percent 
for the latter. For both definitions, the highest incidence is in the Middle East and North Africa, with 
19.7 percent and 10.2 percent. This reflects the important role played by Middle Eastern oil-
producing countries in the generation of current account surpluses in the last thirty-five years.  The 
industrial countries, in contrast, have had the lowest occurrence of surplus adjustments in our 
sample. 
 
5.1 Surplus Adjustments and Exchange Rates 
 
The issue of whether surplus adjustment episodes (as defined above) have historically been 
associated with large exchange rate appreciations is particularly relevant within the context of 
current policy debate on global imbalances.30 Figure 1 presents the evolution of the median 
(bilateral) real exchange rate in surplus adjustment countries. These data are centered on the year of 
the surplus adjustment and presented as an index with a value of 100 in that year. The indexes are 
tracked from three years prior to the current account surplus adjustment to three years after the 
adjustment.31 In this figure, a lower value of the index reflects a real exchange rate appreciation.32 
The figure has three panels: one for advanced countries, one for large countries (defined as having a 
GDP in the top 25 percent of the distribution in 1995), and one for the full sample. In the figure, the 
large and advanced countries samples appear to undergo a visible real exchange rate appreciation in 
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the period surrounding the surplus adjustment episodes, while the full sample shows no significant 
changes in the period around the surplus adjustment episodes. 
Figure 2 shows the behavior of the (median) nominal effective exchange rate index. As before, a 
decline in the index represents a real appreciation. In this case, the picture is rather mixed. The full 
sample shows a slight nominal depreciation, the advanced economies register a small appreciation, 
and the large countries display no clear pattern. 
To gain further insights on the nature of these surplus adjustment episodes, I estimated chi-
squared statistics to test whether the medians in these figures were statistically different at 
different points in time. The tests were performed for three comparisons: three years after the 
adjustment relative to three years previous; one year after the adjustment relative to one year 
previous; and three years after the surplus adjustment relative to one year before the adjustment. 
The results are reported in table 13 for the 2 percent surplus adjustment episodes and in table 14 for 
the 3 percent surplus adjustment episodes. For the real exchange rate, the null hypothesis of equal 
medians is rejected in seven out of the nine cases in this table. The magnitude of the real exchange 
rate adjustment may be quite sizable according to these computations. For instance, for the 2 percent 
surplus adjustment episodes, the median appreciation between one year before and three years after 
the adjustment is 12.6 percent (χ2 = 8.25; p value = 0.004). 
 
5.2 Surplus Adjustments, Interest Rates, Inflation, and Real Growth 
 
Figures 3 and 4 present before-and-after data for real interest rates and inflation for the two 
definitions of surplus adjustments. These figures, together with the chi-squared statistics in tables 
13 and 14, show a small decline in real interest rates and no significant trend for inflation in the 
years following the adjustment. Figure 5 presents data for per capita GDP growth during the period 
surrounding the surplus adjustment episodes. Once again, there is very little action here, and no 
clear pattern of behavior can be extracted from the analysis. This impression is largely supported by 
the results from the chi-squared tests reported in tables 13 and 14. 
 
5.3 Surplus Adjustments and Terms of Trade 
 
Figure 6 investigates whether the surplus adjustment episodes identified in this paper have been 
associated with a sudden deterioration in the terms of trade. All three samples exhibit a worsening 
in the terms of trade in the year of the adjustment (period 0), relative to the previous year. This 
deterioration in the relative price of exports is reverted—in some cases partially and in others more 
than fully—in subsequent years. Despite these changes in the terms of trade, the data on the formal 
tests do not support the hypothesis that surplus adjustment episodes have been driven by terms-of-
trade shock (see the chi-squared tests in tables 13 and 14). 
 
5.5 Current Account Surplus Adjustments versus Deficit Reversals 
 
The picture that emerges in figures 1–6 on the evolution of key macroeconomic variables in the 
period surrounding surplus adjustment episodes is not very sharp, and it does not provide a clear-cut 
pattern of behavior. As one would expect from theory, there is some evidence of real exchange rate 
appreciation, a slight decline in real interest rates, and a short-lived and modest decline in the terms 
of trade in the period surrounding the surplus adjustment. This lack of a well-defined and sharp 
“typical” behavior in current account surplus adjustment episodes contrasts with the case of large 
and abrupt current account reversals. As I document in Edwards (2005a, 2005b), current account 
reversal episodes have historically been characterized by sharp depreciations, significantly higher 
real interest rates, and very significant declines in the growth rate relative to trend. These 
differences between current account reversals and surplus adjustment episodes confirm the notion 
discussed throughout this paper of the asymmetry of these two phenomena. 
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper has addressed several issues regarding current account surplus. First, I identified the 
most important regularities of surpluses during the last thirty-five years, focusing on asymmetries 
between surpluses and deficits. Second, I explored whether large surpluses have been persistent and, 
if so, whether their degree of persistence has been higher than for large deficits. Third, the paper 
assessed the relationship between current account balances and the business cycle and, fourth, the 
relationship between external balances and countries’ net external position. Fifth, I analyzed the 
likelihood that a realignment of world growth rates—with Japan and Europe growing faster and the 
United States growing more slowly—would solve the current situation of global imbalances. This 
issue is a particularly important because a number of analysts and U.S. government officials have 
argued that a normalization of growth would help solve global imbalances. Finally, I dimensioned 
the anatomy of significant and large surplus adjustments, defined as a decline in the surplus of at 
least 2 percent of GDP in one year. 
The analysis generated a number of results. Current account deficits and surpluses exhibit an 
important asymmetry. During the last thirty-five years only 27.6 percent of all countries, on average, 
have run surpluses in a given year. This percentage, however, increased significantly in the last few 
years of the sample. Almost 40 percent of countries posted surpluses in 2003–04. 
The most important recent changes in current account balances have occurred in Asia, where the 
current account reversal exceeded 5 percent of GDP between 1997 and 2003–04. 
Large surpluses exhibit very little persistence through time, and very few large countries have 
had persistently large surpluses-to-GDP ratios. The Middle East displays the most persistent 
surpluses, which largely reflects the role of oil-exporting countries. Large surpluses are slightly more 
persistent than large deficits, but the degree of persistence of both types of imbalance is low.  
Large and abrupt reductions in surpluses—what I call surplus adjustment episodes—are a 
relatively rare phenomenon. Their incidence fluctuates between 3.0 percent and 6.6 percent of all 
country years. The incidence of surplus adjustment episodes has been largest in the Middle East and 
smallest in the advanced countries. Surplus adjustment episodes have been associated with real 
exchange rate appreciations and deterioration in the terms of trade. No clear-cut picture emerges 
regarding the behavior of interest rates, inflation, and economic growth in the period surrounding 
major surplus adjustment episodes. 
The econometric results reported in this paper indicate that the behavior of the current account 
balance can be explained by parsimonious models based on economic theory. In particular, current 
account balances have been associated with the business cycle, real exchange rates, fiscal 
imbalances, and the country’s net external position. All of these variables enter into the current 
account equation with the expected sign, and their coefficients are significant.  
The results obtained suggest that a 1 percentage point decline in growth relative to the long-term 
trend results in an improvement in the current account balance—that is, higher surplus or lower 
deficit—of one quarter of a percentage point of GDP. These results indicate that a realignment of 
global growth—with Japan and the euro area growing faster and the United States moderating its 
growth—would only make a modest contribution toward resolving current global imbalances. This 
suggests that even if there is a realignment of global growth, the world is likely to need significant 
exchange rate movements. Finally, the analysis also suggests that a reduction in China’s very large 
surplus will be needed if global imbalances are to be resolved. 
 





Table A1. Current Account Balances as a Percentage of GDP in the World Economy: Data 
Availability, 1970–2004 
Number of observations 









Africa All  countries 
1970  3  5    8 5 3  24 
1971 3  5    10  6  4  28 
1972 3  6    11  6  4  30 
1973 3  6    11  6  4  30 
1974  11  7 1 12  7  5 43 
1975  20  10  1 19  10  6 66 
1976  24  11  1 21  17  9 83 
1977  33  12  1  23 26 10  105 
1978 37 12  1  23  28  9  110 
1979 38 15  1  23  30  9  116 
1980  41  16  2  23 32 10  124 
1981  42  18  2  23 32 10  127 
1982  43  18  3  23 32 10  129 
1983  43  18  3  23 32 10  129 
1984  43  20  4  23 33 10  133 
1985  45  20  5  23 33 10  136 
1986  47  20  5  23 32 10  137 
1987  48  20  6  23 33 10  140 
1988  48  20  6  23 33 10  140 
1989  48  20  6  23 33 11  141 
1990  48  20  6  23 33 12  142 
1991  48  20  7  23 33 11  142 
1992  48  21  13  23 33 11  149 
1993  48  21  20  23 33 12  157 
1994  48  21  23  23 33 12  160 
1995  47  20  24  24 32 12  159 
1996  46  20  25  24 33 12  160 
1997  45  20  25  24 33 12  159 
1998  43  20  25  23 33 12  156 
1999  43  20  25  24 32 11  155 
2000  43  17  25  24 32 12  153 
2001  44  17  25  25 32 12  155 
2002  39  16  25  24 33 11  148 
2003  37  14  25  24 29 11  140 
2004  27  12  22  24 23 11  119 
All  years  1277  558  363  746 943 338  4225 
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Table A2. Definition of Variables and Data Sources 
Variable     Definition     Source   
Civil liberties    Index of civil liberties    Freedom House  
Coverage of secondary education  Total gross enrollment ratio for secondary 
education 
Barro and Lee (2001)  
Current account      World Development Indicators  
Current account reversal    Reduction in the current account deficit of 
at least 4% of GDP in one year 
Author’s elaboration based on data 
of current account 
Domestic credit growth    Annual growth rate of domestic credit  World Development Indicators  
Export      World Development Indicators  
Fiscal deficit    Overall budget    World Development Indicators  
GDP      World Development Indicators  
Government consumption      IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics 
Import      World Development Indicators   
Inflation    Change in CPI    World Development Indicators   
Initial GDP per capita    GDP per capita in 1970   World Development Indicators   
Investment ratio    Total investment over GDP   IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics 
Net external position      Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006)   
Openness    Predicted trade from bilateral gravity 
equations 
Author’s elaboration   
Population      World Development Indicators   
Real exchange rate    (Nominal Exchange Rate*PPI US) / CPI  World Development Indicators   
Surplus adjustment    Two definitions: at least a 2% reduction in 
surplus in one year; a 3% reduction in 
surplus accumulated over 3 years 
Author’s elaboration based on data 
on capital flows (World 
Development Indicators) 
Sudden stops in region    Relative occurrence of sudden stops in the 
country’s region  (excluding the country 
itself) 
Author’s elaboration 
Terms of trade    Change in term of trade export as capacity 
to imports (constant local currency unit)   
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Table 1. Current Account Balances as a Percentage of GDP in the World Economy: Means, 
1970–2004 










Africa  All countries 
1970 –3.01  –0.26  n.a.  0.05  –7.51  –6.66  –2.81 
1971 –6.01  –0.64  n.a.  0.26  –5.53  –2.50  –2.21 
1972  –4.44  –2.43  n.a.  1.38 –3.78 3.79  –0.68 
1973  –5.10  –1.36  n.a.  1.15 –3.32 1.82  –0.78 
1974 2.25  –4.57  –1.50  –2.51  –3.20  6.44  –0.68 
1975 –4.45  –5.46  –3.55  –1.33  –2.33  8.38 –2.20 
1976 –5.70  0.37  –3.81  –2.00  –1.46  9.42 –1.43 
1977 –3.63  0.76  –5.14  –1.70  –4.08  5.39 –1.97 
1978  –8.25  –1.79  –1.90 –0.42  –3.74  –0.46 –4.06 
1979 –6.02  1.58  –1.60  –1.30  –4.54  8.44 –2.56 
1980 –7.05  –7.49  –0.02  –2.03  –6.91  9.13 –4.72 
1981 –9.51  –11.63  –1.15  –2.32  –10.00  7.61 –7.15 
1982 –10.82  –10.85  –0.96 –2.23  –9.08  1.76 –7.66 
1983  –8.22  –8.22  –1.26 –1.14  –6.53  –1.03 –5.82 
1984  –5.63  –3.07  –0.15 –0.88  –4.27  –0.87 –3.56 
1985  –5.64  –5.04  –1.54 –1.01  –2.84  –0.89 –3.59 
1986  –6.00  –3.84  –2.80 –0.75  –5.44  –0.58 –4.16 
1987  –4.64  –3.20  –0.17 –0.86  –5.42  –0.05 –3.48 
1988 –5.80  –2.85  1.05 –0.71  –4.44  0.03 –3.51 
1989 –4.42  –3.94  –0.33  –0.99  –5.22  4.74 –3.09 
1990 –4.04  –4.50  –2.96  –1.04  –4.26  4.99 –2.86 
1991 –4.40  –2.30  –2.70  –0.71  –6.87  –28.55  –5.87 
1992  –5.33  –3.07  –0.01 –0.46  –5.59  –8.93 –4.12 
1993 –5.39  –4.32  –2.04 0.42  –6.13  –7.68  –4.30 
1994 –4.80  –2.49  –1.37 0.27  –4.80  –3.30  –3.16 
1995 –6.66  –3.24  –3.45 0.80  –5.10  –1.42  –3.91 
1996 –6.51  –2.95  –6.84 0.69  –5.74  –0.32  –4.42 
1997 –4.13  –3.57  –7.31 1.04  –7.83  –0.15  –4.25 
1998 –7.36  –0.44  –9.28 0.18  –8.09  –5.48  –5.68 
1999  –6.69  1.76  –5.31  0.03 –6.45 2.55  –3.63 
2000  –3.58  1.87  –3.02  0.00 –6.00 6.74  –2.02 
2001  –5.99  1.52  –3.27  0.37 –7.61 2.53  –3.38 
2002  –4.78  2.85  –3.56  0.72 –7.46 1.82  –2.96 
2003  –2.48  4.80  –4.40  0.28 –5.42 3.70  –1.75 
2004  –2.07  1.97  –4.56  0.12 –2.97 4.00  –1.29 
All years  –5.65  –2.74  –3.89 –0.50  –5.71  0.47  –3.73 
Source: Author’s calculations, based on World Bank data.  
n.a. Not available. 
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Table 2. Current Account Balances as a Percentage of GDP in the World Economy: 
Medians, 1970–2004 










Africa All  countries 
1970 –1.90  –0.90  n.a.  0.40  –4.07 –5.90  –1.10 
1971 –7.53  –1  n.a.  0.27  –4.6  –7.25  –1.04 
1972 –0.93  –1.55  n.a.  0.71  –1.45 –1.10  –0.41 
1973 –4.40  –0.70  n.a.  0.44  –1.07 –2.18  –0.86 
1974 –2.71  –3.00  –1.50  –1.90 –4.00  0.29  –2.92 
1975 –6.13  –3.64  –3.55  –1.26 –4.09  3.01  –3.30 
1976 –5.17  1.28  –3.81  –1.96 –1.41  2.19  –2.94 
1977 –3.39  0.84  –5.14  –1.89 –3.96  1.45  –2.80 
1978 –9.91  –2.03  –1.90  –0.63 –3.95 –2.76  –3.23 
1979 –4.64  –2.67  –1.60  –0.65 –4.68  9.02  –2.73 
1980 –7.21  –3.77  –0.02  –2.29 –5.59  3.96  –4.04 
1981 –9.44  –8.54  –1.15  –2.58 –7.80 –1.43  –6.46 
1982 –8.68  –7.77  –1.48  –1.84 –7.41  1.53  –5.81 
1983 –6.35  –6.56  –0.86  –0.77 –4.70 –2.98  –4.24 
1984 –2.61  –2.27  –0.63  –0.17 –3.96 –4.84  –2.43 
1985 –3.90  –3.59  –1.51  –0.96 –2.08 –2.68  –2.37 
1986 –3.95  –2.19  –1.94  0.21  –2.98 –2.34  –2.58 
1987 –4.66  –1.68  –0.76  –0.35 –3.95 –2.07  –2.36 
1988 –5.76  –2.57  –0.72  –1.03 –2.36 –2.21  –2.61 
1989 –3.52  –3.44  –1.70  –1.47 –4.36  0.47  –2.63 
1990 –3.78  –3.93  –3.69  –1.37 –2.78  2.82  –2.63 
1991 –3.18  –3.10  –0.7  –0.88 –4.35 –9.38  –2.83 
1992 –4.51  –3.66  0.10  –0.80 –3.98 –9.26  –3.01 
1993 –4.29  –4.11  –2.29  –0.53 –5.47 –6.75  –3.19 
1994 –3.66  –3.49  –1.42  0.35  –3.11 –4.60  –2.28 
1995 –4.48  –4.97  –1.89  0.73  –2.96 –1.37  –2.50 
1996  –4.21  –3.90  –5.01 0.93  –4.50  0.36 –3.43 
1997 –4.65  –2.82  –6.08  0.20  –5.39 –0.15  –3.74 
1998 –5.68  –0.73  –7.21  –0.47 –5.36 –2.56  –4.30 
1999  –6.52  2.73  –5.29 0.26  –4.33  0.26 –2.97 
2000 –4.50  1.71  –4.80  –0.46 –4.50  6.74  –3.18 
2001 –4.79  1.84  –4.74  –0.06 –4.34  3.53  –2.95 
2002  –2.82  3.15  –5.13 0.52  –5.31  5.44 –1.98 
2003 –4.28  2.94  –5.78  –0.10 –3.91  3.53  –1.65 
2004 –3.28  1.83  –5.18  –0.60 –1.09  1.75  –2.00 
All years  –4.74  –2.36  –3.47  –0.55 –4.33 –0.58  –2.96 
Source: Author’s calculations, based on World Bank data.  
n.a. Not available. 
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Table 3. Current Account Balances as Percentage of GDP in the World Economy: 
Proportion of Countries with Surpluses, 1970–2004 













1970  0.333  0.200  n.a. 0.625 0.000 0.000  0.292 
1971  0.000  0.200  n.a. 0.600 0.167 0.250  0.321 
1972  0.000  0.333  n.a. 0.727 0.167 0.500  0.433 
1973  0.000  0.333  n.a. 0.545 0.333 0.500  0.400 
1974  0.273  0.143  0.000  0.333 0.143 0.600  0.279 
1975  0.200  0.100  0.000  0.316 0.200 0.667  0.258 
1976  0.083  0.545  0.000  0.238 0.412 0.667  0.313 
1977  0.242  0.500  0.000  0.304 0.231 0.500  0.305 
1978  0.162  0.333  0.000  0.435 0.250 0.222  0.264 
1979  0.237  0.400  0.000  0.261 0.233 0.556  0.284 
1980  0.244  0.125  0.500  0.217 0.188 0.600  0.242 
1981  0.143  0.000  0.500  0.304 0.094 0.400  0.165 
1982  0.116  0.056  0.333  0.391 0.031 0.500  0.171 
1983  0.093  0.222  0.333  0.348 0.125 0.400  0.194 
1984  0.256  0.250  0.500  0.391 0.212 0.300  0.278 
1985  0.311  0.100  0.000  0.391 0.303 0.300  0.279 
1986  0.213  0.250  0.000  0.565 0.219 0.200  0.270 
1987  0.229  0.250  0.333  0.304 0.212 0.300  0.250 
1988  0.167  0.250  0.333  0.261 0.242 0.200  0.221 
1989  0.208  0.250  0.333  0.348 0.242 0.545  0.277 
1990  0.208  0.200  0.333  0.348 0.303 0.750  0.303 
1991  0.250  0.250  0.429  0.391 0.152 0.182  0.254 
1992  0.188  0.286  0.538  0.391 0.273 0.182  0.282 
1993  0.208  0.190  0.350  0.478 0.242 0.250  0.274 
1994  0.333  0.286  0.391  0.522 0.212 0.417  0.344 
1995  0.277  0.200  0.208  0.542 0.125 0.417  0.277 
1996  0.283  0.250  0.120  0.542 0.091 0.583  0.275 
1997  0.200  0.100  0.120  0.500 0.030 0.500  0.208 
1998  0.116  0.450  0.080  0.478 0.030 0.333  0.205 
1999  0.163  0.600  0.080  0.542 0.156 0.545  0.290 
2000  0.256  0.529  0.200  0.458 0.156 0.667  0.320 
2001  0.227  0.647  0.160  0.480 0.063 0.583  0.297 
2002  0.256  0.688  0.200  0.583 0.152 0.636  0.351 
2003  0.297  0.786  0.160  0.500 0.241 0.818  0.386 
2004  0.259  0.583  0.227  0.458 0.304 0.727  0.378 
All years  0.215  0.305  0.215  0.422 0.185 0.462  0.276 
Source: Author’s calculations, based on World Bank data.  
n.a. Not available. 
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Table 4. Countries with Persistently High Current Account Surpluses, 1970–2004a 
High Surplus 1    High Surplus 2 
Region and country    Years     Country   Years  
Industrial countries        
Belgium 1989–2001    Germany  1986–89 
Finland   1995–2004     Luxembourg   1995–99  
Germany   1984–90     Malta   1975–81  
Japan   1983–89     Norway   2000–2004  
Luxembourg   1995–2004     Switzerland   1991–2001  
Malta   1972–82        
Netherlands   1972–77; 1981–8;5 1987–
91; 1993–99  
    
Norway   1980–85; 1994–97; 1999–
2004  
    
Switzerland   1981–2004        
United Kingdom   1980–83        
Latin America and the Caribbean      
Guyana   1986–89     Suriname   1987–90; 1992–95  
Panama   1987–90     Venezuela  1999–2004  
Suriname   1987–90; 1992–95          
Trinidad and Tobago   1975–78; 1992–96; 1999–
2003  
       
Uruguay   1988–91          
Venezuela  1994–97; 1999–2004          
Asia        
China    1994–97     Hong Kong, China   1984–90  
Fiji   1985–88     Papua New Guinea   1993–96  
Hong Kong, China   1970–78; 1983–94; 2001–
04  
  Singapore   1989–92; 1994–2004  
Korea, Rep.   1986–89          
Malaysia   1998–2003          
Papua New Guinea   1992–96          
Singapore   1988–2004          
Africa        
Botswana   1985–89; 1991–2003     Botswana   1985–89; 1991–99  
Chad   1980–84     Gabon   1979–84; 1994–97; 1999–
2003  
Gabon   1978–84; 1994–97; 1999–
2003  
  Gambia, The   1987–90  
Gambia, The   1984–92     Lesotho   1990–94  
Lesotho   1980–84; 1989–94     Libya   1977–80  
Liberia   1979–82          
Libya   1977–80; 1994–97          
Mauritania   1995–2001          
Namibia   1990–2004          
Nigeria   1989–92; 1999–2004          
South Africa   1977–80; 1985–93          
Swaziland   1986–91          
Zimbabwe   1986–89          
Middle East and North Africa      
Kuwait   1975–90; 1993–2004     Kuwait   1980–90; 1993–2004  
Saudi Arabia   1971–74       1998–2004  
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Russian Federation  1998–2004     Russian Federation   
Ukraine   1999–2004        
Other        
Samoa   1995–98         
a. The two measures of high surpluses are defined as follows. High Surplus 1 is an index that takes the value of one if, in a particular year, a country’s surplus is 
among its region’s 25 percent highest surpluses; the index takes a value of zero otherwise. High Surplus 2 takes the value of one if, in a particular year, a country’s 
surplus is among its region’s 10 percent highest surpluses; it takes a value of zero otherwise.  
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Table 5. Persistence in Current Account Imbalances: Marginal Effects from Variance 
Component Probitsa 
 High  1    High 2 
Explanatory variable  Surplus Deficit    Surplus Deficit 
Lag 1  0.403  0.478    0.137 0.279 
 (12.53)***  (18.99)***    (4.35)*** (5.66)*** 
Lag 2  0.059  0.085    0.040 0.032 
 (2.62)***  (3.32)***    (2.50)** (1.92)* 
Lag 3  0.008  0.032    0.015 0.003 
 (0.39)  (1.28)    (1.37) (0.24) 
Lag 4  0.089  0.084    0.025 0.021 
 (3.75)***  (3.39)***    (1.96)** (1.36) 
Summary statistic         
Probability 0.122  0.788    0.025 0.034 
No. observations  3415  3415    3415 3415 
No. groups  161  161    161 161 
* The null hypothesis is rejected at the 10 percent level.  
** The null hypothesis is rejected at the 5 percent level.  
*** The null hypothesis is rejected at the 1 percent level.  
a. The dependent variable is high surplus 1 and 2 and high deficit 1 and 2, as indicated. The estimation model is a variance component probit, with the following 
explanatory variables: lags of the dependent variable, time fixed effects, country fixed effects, and region fixed effects. Test t statistics are in parentheses. 
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Table 6. Countries with Persistently High Current Account Surpluses, Convertible 
Currency, 1970–2004a 
Region and country  Years 
Industrial countries   
Belgium 1991–97 
France 1995–2001 






Latin America and the Caribbean   
El Salvador  1979–84 
Trinidad and Tobago  1990–96; 1999–2003 
Venezuela, RB  1999–2004 
Asia   
China 1994–2004 
Hong Kong, China  1970–80; 1982–94 
Papua New Guinea  1993–97 
Singapore 1988–2004 
Africa   
Botswana 1985–89;  1991–2001 
Ethiopia 1993–97 
Gabon 1978–84;  1999–2003 
Namibia 1990–2004 
Nigeria 1999–2004 
South Africa  1985–94 
Swaziland 1986–91 
Middle East and North Africa   
Kuwait  1977–81; 1983–90; 1993–2004 
Saudi Arabia  1971–77; 2000–04 
Eastern Europe   
Russian Federation  1992–2004 
Ukraine 1999–2004 
a. A high surplus is defined as in table 4, except that the surplus is measured in convertible currency instead of relative to GDP. 28  Sebastián Edwards 
 
Table 7. The Current Account and the Business Cycle: Variance Component Regressions, 
1970–2004a 















Growth gap  0.217  0.18  0.207    0.225 0.191  0.206 
 (5.72)***  (3.21)*** (4.5)***    (5.8)*** (3.3)***  (4.3)*** 
Change in terms of trade  0.028  0.113  0.013    0.029 0.114  0.013 
 (2.25)**  (4.74)***  (0.97)    (2.24) (4.75)***  (0.96) 
Public sector deficit / GDP  –0.162  –0.211  –0.06    –0.188 –0.222  –0.116 
 (–4.23)***  (–4.08)***  (–1.13)    (–4.38) (–4.14)***  (–1.66)* 
Accumulated change in RER  0.008  0.004  0.026    0.008 0.004  0.026 
 (3.62)***  (3.54)*** (4.44)***    (4.25)*** (4.37)***  (4.47)*** 
Net external position / GDP  0.064  0.069  0.07    –– ––  –– 
 (9.06)***  (5.54)*** (5.66)***        
Summary statistic             
R2 0.2377  0.3627  0.184    0.0628 0.0822  0.0995 
No. observations  1001  522  479    1001 522  479 
No. groups   41  20  21    41 20  21 
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
a. The dependent variable is the current account over GDP. The sample includes all countries with a GDP in 1995 of at least US$52 billion,  resulting in forty-one 
countries over the period 1974–2004. Test t statistics are in parentheses. 
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Table 8. Net External Position Regressions, 1970–2004a 
Explanatory variable  No regional dummies  Regional dummies 
Trade openness  0.293  0.163 
 (2.3)**  (1.18) 
Gov. consumption / GDP  –2.488  –2.507 
 (–2.48)**  (–2.13)** 
Commodity dummy  –3.592  –5.223 
 (–0.85)  (–1.02) 
Political stability  6.616  1.541 
 (1.73)*  (0.33) 
GDP per capita  –1.622  –3.159 
 (–0.71)  (–1.31) 
Financial openness  0.39  0.395 
 (1.29)  (1.29) 
Inflation –0.153  –0.13 
 (–3.87)***  (–3.03)*** 
Initial GDP per capita   28.329  29.45 
 (5.84)***  (4.72)*** 
Summary statistic    
R2 0.1747  0.2104 
Between R2 0.3986  0.4555 
No. observations  2912  2904 
No. groups  130  129 
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
a. The dependent variable is the net external position over GDP. The  estimation model is a between-effects estimator. The sample and sample period are defined 
in table 5, but are constrained by data availability. Test t statistics are in parentheses. 
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Table 9: The Current Account and the Business Cycle, Alternative Measure of NEP/GDP: 
Variance Component Regressions, 1970–2004 
Explanatory variable  Large countries  Industrial countries 
Nonindustrial 
countries 
Growth gap  0.244  0.155  0.251 
 (6.00)***  (2.68)***  (5.17)*** 
Change in terms of trade  0.027  0.127  0.012 
 (2.06)**  (4.65)***  (0.84) 
Public sector deficit / GDP  –0.139  –0.138  –0.04 
 (–3.3)***  (–2.79)***  (–0.67) 
Accumulated change in RER   0.007  0.005  0.025 
 (3.54)***  (3.92)***  (4.33)*** 
Net external position / GDP  0.017  0.049  0.011 
 (2.78)***  (6.83)***  (2.51)** 
Summary statistic     
R2 0.1611  0.391  0.1446 
No. observations  949  488  461 
No. groups  41  20  21 
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  





Table 10. The Current Account and the Business Cycle: Variance Component 
Instrumental Variable Regressions, 1970–2004a 
Explanatory variable  Large countries  Industrial countries 
Nonindustrial 
countries 
Accumulated change in REER  0.067  –0.001  0.111 
 (2.02)**  (–0.04)  (0.044)** 
Growth gap  0.155  0.19  1.36 
 (2.76)***  (3.39)***  (0.074) 
Change in terms of trade  0.011  0.124  –0.180 
 (0.61)  (4.74)***  (0.019) 
Public sector deficit / GDP  –0.163  –0.190  0.040 
 (–3.42)***  (–2.4)**  (0.066) 
Net external position / GDP  0.075  0.069  5.590 
 (9.65)***  (5.55)***  (0.015)*** 
Summary statistic     
R2 0.0916  0.3706  0.1069 
Between R2 0.5953  0.6783  0.7941 
No. observations  924  475  449 
No. groups  40  19  21 
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
a. The dependent variable is the current account over GDP. The estimation model is instrumental variables (IV) with random effects, using the following 
instruments: an index that measures the proportion of countries in the country’s region that were subject to a sudden decline in capital inflows, lagged one period; a 
similar index that measures the incidence of sudden declines in inflows in other regions, also lagged one period; changes in the terms of trade, lagged two periods; 
inflation, lagged two periods; initial (1970) per capita GDP; population growth; and regional dummy variables. The sample includes all countries with a GDP in 1995 of 
at least US$52 billion, resulting in forty countries over the period 1974–2004. Test t statistics are in parentheses. 
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Table 11. The Current Account and the Business Cycle: Variance Component Regressions 
with Interactions, 1970–2004a 
Explanatory variable  Full sample 
Growth gap  0.124 
 (2.27)** 
Change in terms of trade  0.033 
 (2.48)** 
Public sector deficit / GDP  –0.073 
 (–1.85)* 
Accumulated change in RER   0.008 
 (4.01)*** 
Net external position / GDP  0.055 
 (8.09)*** 
Growth gap / GDP interactions with   




Africa   0.523 
 (2.75)*** 
Middle East and North Africa  0.037 
 (0.3) 
Eastern Europe  –0.081 
 (–0.84) 
Net external position / GDP interactions with   




Africa   –0.036 
 (–0.85) 
Middle East and North Africa  –0.004 
 (–0.22) 
Eastern Europe  –0.001 
 (–0.02) 
Summary statistic   
R2 0.3031 
Between R2 0.6068 
No. observations  949 
No. groups  41 
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
a. The sample includes all countries with a GDP in 1995 of at least US$52 billion, resulting in forty-one countries over the period 1974–2004. Test t statistics are 
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Table 12. Surplus Adjustment Episodes: Incidence by Region, 1970–2004 
Sample group  2% surplus adjustment  3% surplus adjustment 
Industrial countries  2.51  1.64 
Latin America and the Caribbean  5.41  2.15 
Asia 6.93  3.43 
Africa 6.3  2.51 
Middle East and North Africa  19.69  10.2 
Eastern Europe  5.62  2.43 





Table 13: Two Percent Surplus Adjustment Episodes: Nonparametric Testsa 
All countries    Industrial countries    Large countries  Period of comparison and 
explanatory variable  χ2 Obs.    χ2 Obs.    χ2 Obs. 
t = +3 versus t = –3               
Real exchange rate  3.609*  233    0 22    2.45 80 
Nominal exchange rate  35.645***  258    0.727 22    9.561*** 82 
Real interest rate  0.0554  147    0.09 13    3.431* 49 
GDP per capita growth  6.109**  251    0 22    3.574* 81 
Inflation 2.865*  238    0.727 22    0.05 80 
Terms of trade  0.2243  164    0.09 13    0.015 61 
              
t = +1 versus t = –1               
Real exchange rate  10.9325***  257    6.042** 24   14.4061***  85 
Nominal exchange rate  31.2238***  281    2.6853 24    8.3887*** 87 
Real interest rate  2.9858*  177    0.2917 14    0.6676 54 
GDP per capita growth  0  278    0.6713 24    0.0465 86 
Inflation 0.5547  260    0 24    0.1051 85 
Terms of trade  30.2112***  187    0 16   14.3338***  67 
              
t = +3 versus t = –1               
Real exchange rate  5.5415**  247    2.9091* 22    8.2488*** 82 
Nominal exchange rate  47.9801***  273    0.7273 22    9.3386*** 84 
Real interest rate  7.1592***  171    0.0903 13    3.7692* 52 
GDP per capita growth  0.4495  269    0 22    0.9736 83 
Inflation 2.4481  255    0 22    0.0488 82 
Terms of trade  13.9164***  180    0 14   10.5625***  64 
* The null hypothesis is rejected at the 10 percent level.  
** The null hypothesis is rejected at the 5 percent level.  
*** The null hypothesis is rejected at the 1 percent level.  
a. The null hypothesis is that the medians are equal.  
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Table 14. Three Percent Surplus Adjustment Episodes: Nonparametric Testsa 
All countries    Industrial countries    Large countries  Period of comparison and 
explanatory variable  χ2 Obs.    χ2 Obs.    χ2 Obs. 
t = +3 versus t = –3               
Real exchange rate  1.2217  118    0.0764 11    1.316 37 
Nominal exchange rate  18.9553***  129    0.0764 11    0.235 39 
Real interest rate  0.0607  68    0.5 8    1.1494 21 
GDP per capita  0  124    0.8831 11    0.0244 39 
CPI 2.421  119    0.0764 11    0.0285 37 
Terms of trade  2.4747  80    0.1094 7    0.6154 26 
              
t = +1 versus t = –1               
Real exchange rate  6.4127**  131    1.1429 14    2.2727 44 
Nominal exchange rate  14.3686***  144    1.1429 14    5.5652** 46 
Real interest rate  0.014  81    0.5 8    0.0344 27 
GDP per capita  1.2107  139    0 14    1.3913 46 
CPI 2.7507*  131    0 14    0.0909 44 
Terms of trade  6.7189***  93    0.5 8    2.5996 31 
              
t = +3 versus t = –1               
Real exchange rate  1.1616  124    1.3714 12    0.2317 41 
Nominal exchange rate  21.3833***  136    0 12    5.2122** 43 
Real interest rate  0.4618  78    0.5 8    1.0193 25 
GDP per capita  1.0912  132    1.3714 12    0.601 43 
CPI 2.5721  126    1.3714 12    0.0211 41 
Terms of trade  0.0112  87    0.1094 7    0.5744 28 
* The null hypothesis is rejected at the 10 percent level.  
** The null hypothesis is rejected at the 5 percent level.  
*** The null hypothesis is rejected at the 1 percent level.  
a. The null hypothesis is that the medians are equal.  
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Figure 1. Real Exchange Rate  
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Figure 2. Nominal Exchange Rate 
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Figure 3. Real Interest Rate 
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Figure 4. Inflation 
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Figure 5. Per Capital GDP Growth 
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Figure 6. Terms of Trade 
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